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A. Introduction 
 
In the European internal market consumers have a wide choice of products that become 
increasingly available through cross-border shopping. Sometimes sellers frustrate 
consumers‟ contractual expectations by delivering goods that are not of satisfactory 
quality. To guarantee a minimum level of consumer protection, EC Directive 1999/44 
requires that goods must be in conformity with the contract of sale.
1
 This rule applies 
regardless of whether the seller behaved negligently. In cases of non conformity 
consumers have a choice of different remedies for breach of contract by the seller, such 
as repair or replacement or price reduction. The Directive has been presented as a 
significant step towards creating an internal consumer market, which would be impeded 
by fragmented and heterogeneous consumer protection rules. It may be followed in the 
future by further harmonization initiatives in the field of consumer sales law. 
 
From an economic perspective, two sets of questions arise. First, it may be asked whether 
legal intervention is necessary to guarantee quality in markets for consumer goods. The 
standard economic answer to this question is that legal rules may cure market failures, in 
particular problems of asymmetric information. However, any legal intervention must be 
justified by a benefit-cost analysis to enhance economic efficiency and avoid 
counterproductive effects. Consumer protection should be increased only up to the point 
where its marginal cost equals its marginal benefit. Moreover, market failures should not 
be replaced by government failures, which lead to outcomes that are worse than those of 
imperfect markets. Second, Law and Economics scholars have critically analyzed the 
question relating to the best level of government for designing regulatory responses to 
market failures. Should rules of consumer protection be enacted at the European level or 
should regulatory action be taken by the Member States? The economic analysis of 
federalism and regulatory competition provides several useful insights that are also 
relevant for discussing the desirability of harmonization of consumer sales law to further 
market integration. 
 
The structure of this paper is as follows. Section B addresses the question to what extent 
the market mechanism itself may cure problems of quality deterioration in markets for 
consumer goods. Particular attention is devoted to the economic function of warranties 
that are an important means to overcome information asymmetry, affect manufacturers‟ 
incentives to increase quality and provide insurance coverage to consumers. Section C 
analyzes the main provisions of EC Directive 1999/44: the rule on non conformity, the 
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remedies available to the consumer, and the allocation of liability in the contractual chain 
(from manufacturer to importer/wholesaler and retailer). In this section, attention is also 
paid to the implementation of the Directive by the Member States. Even though a full 
discussion of national laws is outside the scope of this paper, some illustrations will 
prove to be very useful for a better understanding of the economic analysis. Section D 
questions the desirability of harmonization of consumer sales law. It offers an overview 
of the benefits and costs of either harmonization or competition between legal rules and 
applies these insights to EC Directive 1999/44. Section E concludes. 
 
 
B. Quality deterioration and the market mechanism 
 
Below we first provide an overview of the main insights from the economic analysis of 
consumer protection. This will allow us to understand the reasons of quality deterioration 
in markets for consumer goods and will explain why goods do not always meet 
consumers‟ expectations. Thereafter, we pay particular attention to the role of warranties. 
This part of the paper will provide insights that are crucial for a proper understanding of 
the relation between the economic functions of warranties and the rule on non 
conformity, to be further discussed in Section C. 
 
I. Why consumer markets may fail in providing optimal quality 
 
In his seminal article The Market for Lemons, Nobel Prize laureate George Akerlof shows 
that quality uncertainty may cause a process of „adverse selection‟ through which good 
quality products are driven out of the market by bad quality products.
2
 Akerlof has 
considered formally a market where information is imperfect. The seriousness of the 
information problems depends on both the nature of the goods and the personal 
qualifications of the buyers (professional buyers or consumers). A useful distinction can 
be made between search qualities, experience qualities and credence qualities.
3
 If goods 
have search qualities, consumers may be informed by inspection prior to the purchase; 
examples include fresh fruit and vegetables and also (the colour of) textiles. In other 
cases consumers can only learn about quality after purchase. Goods having experience 
qualities include, among others, houses, cars and stereo equipment. When experience 
goods are bought, quality uncertainty may be reduced through the „repeat purchase 
mechanism‟. The use of the goods may provide the necessary information about quality 
enabling the consumer to decide whether (s)he will make a repeat purchase or not. For 
some products and services, consumers will not be able to assess quality even after 
purchase. In such cases quality uncertainty is replaced by „trust‟. Goods or services that 
possess credence qualities, such as complex medical services but also repair services for 
durable consumer goods, are bought whenever buyers are sufficiently confident about the 
professional qualifications of the supplier.  
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If consumers are not fully informed, two problems arise. First, in the short run inefficient 
contracts will be concluded. Consumers may also buy goods if the purchase price is 
higher than the utility they derive from those goods; transfers of goods will not be Pareto 
optimal.
4
 Second, in the long run bad quality may drive out good quality, as suggested by 
Akerlof. If consumers cannot distinguish beforehand between good quality and bad 
quality while sellers can, the maximum price the buyers are willing to pay will be based 
on average quality. Sellers of good quality face a situation in which the price consumers 
are willing to pay is below the real value of the product. At this market price sellers may 
decide not to sell the product and withdraw from the market. If sellers of good quality 
leave the market, average quality drops and, hence, the price buyers are willing to pay 
goes down. More sellers of relative good quality will decide to withdraw from the market 
and, in the end, only the lowest quality will be offered for sale. This process of adverse 
selection leading to a general lowering of quality is the consequence of a market failure: 
uninformed buyers are confronted with informed sellers (asymmetric information). The 
example of the second-hand car market (a „lemon‟ is a second hand car of inferior 
quality) offers a nice illustration of this theoretical argument. In the absence of remedies, 
information failures may cause a breakdown of this market. 
 
Substantial information asymmetries between manufactures and traders on the one hand 
and consumers on the other provide the most important economic rationale for consumer 
protection policies when market-based solutions are unlikely to emerge. Legal 
intervention may be one of two types: default rules or mandatory regulation. Default rules 
may fill in gaps if parties did not draft a fully specified contract, which allocates the risk 
of all possible contingencies. Transaction costs of writing fully specified contracts are 
prohibitively high. Hence, default rules can save on transaction costs and improve 
efficiency by providing an allocation of risks which the parties would have preferred in a 
world of zero transaction costs where contract negotiation is entirely costless.
5
 
Regulation, putting freely negotiated contracts aside, reaches much further and should be 
used only if a number of strict conditions is met.
6
 The benefits to the consumers, in the 
form of improved quality, must outweigh the administrative and compliance costs of the 
regulations. This benefit-cost criterion is based on the concept of Kaldor-Hicks 
efficiency.
7
 According to this criterion, legal changes should be introduced if the gains 
they bring to the winners are so large that they could potentially compensate the losers. In 
Europe, full-fledged benefit-cost analyses of consumer regulations are seldom conducted. 
In the absence of empirical studies costs tend to be chronically underestimated. This is 
partly because consumer laws have been developed piecemeal. As a result, the 
incremental cost of each new initiative has seemed minor when looked at individually, 
even though the totality of the regulatory impact may be enormous.  
 
                                                 
4
 On the concept of Pareto-optimality, see among others H.-B. Schäfer and C. Ott, The Economic Analysis 
of Civil Law, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar 2004, p. 22; R.D. Cooter and T.S. Ulen, Law & Economics, 5
th
 
Edition, Boston: Pearson Addison Wesley 2008, p. 17. 
5
 Schäfer and Ott 2004, p. 299; Cooter and Ulen 2008, p. 217 ff. 
6
 A.I. Ogus, Regulation. Legal Form and Economic Theory, Oxford: Clarendon Press 1994, p. 28. 
7
 On this concept, see Schäfer and Ott 2004, p. 28 ff; Cooter and Ulen 2008, p. 47. 
 4 
 
II. The market‟s response, in particular the role of commercial warranties 
 
The market itself offers a number of remedies that may overcome the adverse selection 
problem: brands, advertising, reputation and warranties. For a proper understanding of 
the economic effects of EC Directive 1999/44 the role of warranties is crucial; it will be 
discussed extensively below. Here, some general remarks about other market 
mechanisms are provided. Brand names are a method sellers use to implicitly guarantee 
superior quality, because product quality must remain sufficiently high to attract repeat 
purchases.
8
 Producers having large investments in a brand name will not want to lose the 
goodwill attached to it. The same reasoning applies to advertising: heavy investments in 
advertising only pay back if the seller can rely on profits resulting from repeat purchases 
by satisfied consumers. In cases where there is a danger of opportunistic behaviour (i.e. 
sellers trying to achieve high profits by selling low quality products), efficiency concerns 
require that consumers‟ confidence is protected if information costs are reduced and a 
confidence premium is paid to the sellers.
9
 Rational consumers may be assumed to be 
willing to pay higher prices if, by doing so, they can save on information costs. An 
optimal confidence premium exactly equals the savings from the reduction of information 
costs. Advertising reduces the search costs of consumers and the costs of advertising 
campaigns are passed on to consumers via higher resale prices, enabling the sellers to 
earn a confidence premium. Even if advertisements are seen as merely persuasive, the 
informative value of advertising does not automatically fall to zero. Under some 
circumstances the amount of persuasive advertising may be a signal of quality.
10
 High-
quality firms selling experience goods will earn high confidence premiums; as a 
consequence they have a greater incentive to advertise than low-quality firms do. If 
sellers truthfully disclose high quality and keep quality constant, they will be able to earn 
high confidence premiums.  
 
Besides brands and advertising, goodwill may be acquired by building a reputation. Firms 
may gain a clientele that is prepared to pay high prices. The confidence premiums can be 
used to guarantee quality and finance the costs of legal protection of buyers. However, 
the reputation mechanism only works if a number of conditions are satisfied. First, there 
must be repeated interactions between sellers and buyers. Second, buyers must be able to 
learn from product use about the product‟s quality. Third, the seller must have sunk an 
important amount of specific capital in his or her business. These conditions will be more 
easily satisfied in business-to-business relations than in business-to-consumer contracts. 
A classic example of where the conditions for building reputation are not satisfied is the 
market for second-hand cars. Consumers do not buy regularly from the same seller, there 
is no information exchange on the risks of sold products and there is very little specific 
                                                 
8
 B. Klein and K. Leffler, „The Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contractual Performance‟, (21) Journal 
of Political Economy 1981, p. 615-641. 
9
 Schäfer and Ott 2004, p. 377-381 
10
 P. Milgrom and J. Roberts, „Price and Advertising Signals of Product Quality‟, (26) Journal of Political 
Economy 1986, p. 796-821. 
 5 
capital invested.
11
 Consequently, the reputation mechanism does not work and fly-by-
night firms may enter to market to reap high premiums for opportunistic behaviour. 
 
Commercial guarantees or warranties
12
 are promises made by manufacturers or sellers to 
assume specific responsibilities in case the quality or performance of goods do not 
conform to the contractual expectations of buyers. There is a large body of Law and 
Economics literature on warranties.
13
 Authors agree that warranties have three main 
economic functions: i) they contribute to risk spreading (insurance function); ii) they 
improve information flows in consumer markets (information revealing function or 
signaling function), and iii) they provide incentives to perform the contract (incentive 
function).
14
 Theoretically warranties may cover the entire life of products (full warranty) 
but in practice commercial warranties are limited in time and scope (partial warranties). 
Given the different economic functions, the „optimal‟ warranty will vary according to the 
risk attitudes of sellers and buyers, the availability of information in markets and the 
possibility of either sellers and/or buyers to control the risk of non conformity. A full 
warranty will be efficient only under very restrictive conditions; partial warranties will be 
preferable in the vast majority of cases.
15
 
 
The first economic function of a warranty is to provide insurance when the risk that the 
product is unsatisfactory is exogenous. This implies that neither the seller nor the buyer 
may control the risk of non conformity. If the warranty is an instrument for providing 
insurance, the seller should offer a full warranty if (s)he is the superior risk-bearer. 
Conversely, no warranty should be offered if the buyer is better able to bear the risk. In 
the economic terminology, a full warranty is efficient if the seller is risk-neutral and the 
consumer is risk-averse whereas no warranty should be offered if the seller is risk-averse 
and the buyer is risk-neutral.
16
 A risk-averse buyer is prepared to pay an insurance 
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premium to guarantee the quality of the product that is higher than the expected value of 
the loss. For example, if the expected loss amounts to € 10, a risk-averse buyer is willing 
to pay more than € 100 instead of getting the product without a warranty but a reduced 
price of € 90. If the seller is risk-neutral, - i.e. (s)he is indifferent between selling the 
product at 90 without warranty or at 100 with warranty - , a warranty is the most efficient 
way of insuring risk-averse buyers.
 17
 The reason is that alternative third-party insurance 
would be too costly and lead to moral hazard
18
 on the part of the seller. It follows from 
the foregoing that warranties play no role if both seller and buyer are risk-neutral since in 
this scenario there is no need to reallocate risks. Even though it is safe to assume that 
sellers are generally risk-neutral, in some cases also sellers will not be completely 
indifferent towards risk and full warranties will then be inefficient. In the last scenario 
optimal warranties should be partial and reflect the different degrees of risk aversion of 
both sellers and buyers.
19
 
 
The second economic function of a warranty is to reveal information; it can be 
characterized also as a signaling function. The optimal warranty will differ according to 
the distribution of information in markets. Below, four hypotheses are distinguished.
20
 
i) If the seller possesses private information and the buyer has no such information, the 
above mentioned „market for lemons‟ problem will materialize. If buyers cannot 
distinguish low quality from high quality products, they will not be willing to pay a price 
that is higher than the value of average quality and a process of adverse selection will 
start developing. The ensuing quality deterioration can be stopped if sellers offer full 
warranties. The price of this warranty will at least equal the expected cost of future 
claims for non performance. Warranties will be expensive for low quality products but 
cheaper for high quality products. If the price of the warranty is indicated separately from 
the price of the product itself, buyers will be able to infer the actual type of seller from 
the observation of the warranty offered. Also, the quality signal may be too expensive for 
sellers of low-quality goods, since they would become more costly than high-quality 
goods. In the terminology of game theory, a separating equilibrium will occur.
21
 In this 
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way, the information asymmetry of buyers preferring high quality-high price products is 
cured and the process of adverse selection is stopped.  
ii) In the converse hypothesis, where the buyer possesses private information (e.g. on the 
use of the product) whereas the seller has no such information, an optimal outcome will 
be achieved if products are sold without a warranty. The intensity of use varies 
significantly across buyers, as a comparison of private use (car used by a family) and 
commercial or industrial use (car used by a taxi company) may illustrate. Sellers cannot 
always distinguish high loss buyers from low loss buyers but the latter will make 
themselves known by buying products without warranty at a discounted price. 
iii) In the absence of information asymmetries in markets, warranties have no information 
revealing function. 
iv) Finally, in many real-life cases both sellers and buyers have private information and, 
therefore, partial warranties will be optimal. Sellers are aware of the percentage of goods 
that will likely become defective after some use and buyers have private information on 
the future use of the good. In equilibrium, high defect rate sellers will serve buyers with 
small individual losses and low defect rate sellers will sell to buyers who expect large 
losses.
22
 
 
The third economic function of a warranty relates to contract performance. In as far a 
warranty fulfils an insurance function, the risk is exogenous and warranties do not play a 
role in providing incentives to supply goods that are of satisfactory quality. The picture 
changes in case of endogenous risks, so that the seller and/or the buyer control(s) the risk 
of product failure. If the seller controls the risk of non conformity, (s)he is the „cheapest 
risk avoider‟ and a full warranty will be efficient. The warranty improves product quality, 
since it may pay the seller to invest in lowering the risk of having to take care of repair or 
replacement or pay damages. The seller will have an incentive to invest in additional 
quality measures as long as the marginal benefit of those measures (improved product 
quality and increased consumer satisfaction) exceeds the marginal cost in terms of 
remedies claimed by the buyer. By contrast, if the buyer controls the risk, no warranty 
should be offered. If both seller and buyer control the risk of non conformity, a partial 
warranty will be efficient.  
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C. Economic analysis of EC Directive 99/44 and its implementation in some Member 
States 
 
I. The conformity requirement  
 
The seller is liable to the consumer for the conformity of the goods with the contract of 
sale. According to Article 2 of the Directive, consumer goods are presumed to be in 
conformity with the contract if they: i) comply with the description given by the seller, ii) 
are fit for any particular purpose for which the consumer requires them and which is 
made known to the seller, iii) are fit for the purposes for which goods of the same type 
are normally used, and iv) show the quality and performance, which are normal in goods 
of the same type and which the consumer can reasonably expect, also taking into account 
statements in advertising or on labeling.  
 
1. Does the conformity requirement equal a statutory warranty? 
 
There exist different views in the literature regarding the qualification of the conformity 
requirement as a mandatory legal warranty. In the economic and marketing literature, a 
very broad definition of a warranty is used: it encompasses all legally enforceable claims 
by the buyer against the seller if the purchased product does not meet the buyers‟ 
expectations.
23
 Within this broad definition, the rule on non conformity can be seen as a 
legally required warranty. Lawyers may object to this qualification since legal systems 
usually distinguish the buyers‟ rights that are based on legislation from promises given by 
the seller to assume specific responsibilities in case of defective or unsuitable products. In 
case the buyer wants to invoke the warranty, (s)he is relieved from proving that the defect 
was present at the time of the sale and the passing of the risk. From a strictly legal 
perspective, it may be argued that the (objectionable) qualification of the conformity 
requirement as a mandatory legal warranty is caused by the combination of a duty to 
deliver goods of satisfactory quality and the limitation periods, which make the exercise 
of consumers‟ rights subject to time limits that are typical of warranties offered by sellers 
of consumer goods. It should be added that the Directive itself also distinguishes the 
conformity requirement (Articles 2-3) and guarantees offered by sellers (Article 6). With 
respect to the latter, the regulation is kept to a minimum. Commercial guarantees may not 
affect the consumer‟s rights under national law and must provide intelligible information 
on the scope of the warranty, its duration, and the conditions for making claims. Article 6 
of the Directive does not regulate the scope of coverage of the guarantee or the remedies 
offered to consumers. Consequently, it enables producers and retailers to offer different 
commercial warranties that provide full or partial coverage and diverging remedies. In 
sum, a legal distinction can be made between the duty to deliver goods that are in 
conformity with the contract of sale and commercial guarantees. However, as will be 
further explained below, the rule on non conformity generates economic effects that are 
similar to legal rights provided by warranties. This causes a number of problems from a 
perspective of economic efficiency. 
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It seems clear that the European legislator did not have the economic functions of 
warranties in mind when the text of the Directive was drafted. The three main goals of 
warranties require different levels of protection. Parties may be better informed than a 
regulator about the risk and they may negotiate a warranty coverage and remedies that 
optimally suit their preferences. The legislator could reduce the transaction costs of 
negotiating by setting default rules but should remain extremely reluctant to impose 
mandatory rules that may inhibit the development of optimal warranties through the 
market mechanism. If one tries to find an implicit economic logic, the Directive‟s 
formulation focuses mainly on the incentive function of warranties. In his or her capacity 
as the cheapest risk avoider, the seller is given an incentive to deliver goods of sufficient 
quality in order to avoid the imposition of one of the remedies given to the buyer. One 
may also deduce an insurance function from the strict liability rule contained in Article 3 
(1) in fine. The liability for non conformity includes risks that existed at the time of 
delivery and could not be controlled for by the seller. However, liability for risks due to 
exogenous events that happened after the delivery of the product is excluded, so that the 
conformity requirement does not provide full insurance coverage. The difference between 
a legal and an economic approach becomes most clear if the signaling function of 
warranties is taken into account. The EC Directive missed the opportunity to improve 
market transparency. Sellers should have been forced to separately indicate the product 
price and the price for the warranty.
24
 The full product price includes the costs of 
production, the costs of expected claims for non conformity and the profit margin of the 
seller. The price of the warranty reflects the scope of the insurance coverage offered as 
well as the costs of warranty claims exceeding the legal duties under the conformity 
requirement. Unfortunately on this point the Directive is fully deprived of economic logic 
since a guarantee is defined as obligations “given without extra charge”, to reimburse the 
price paid or to replace, repair consumer goods if they do not meet the specifications set 
out in the guarantee statement (Article 1, 2e). This definition neglects the basic economic 
insight that the price of warranties varies according to the scope of their coverage and 
that revealing these prices improves market transparency. 
 
The discussion about whether the Directive has imposed a statutory warranty would be 
futile if the market could correct a potential misallocation of legal rights. According to 
the Coase theorem
25
, sellers and consumers will negotiate a solution that maximizes their 
joint benefits. If the statutory warranty has too long a duration and is too expensive, the 
legal assignment of rights only provides a start point from where the scope of coverage 
and the duration of the protection can be corrected. The same negotiation process may 
rectify warranties granting legal protection which is too limited in scope or time. 
Unfortunately, the Directive imposes mandatory rules. Parties may not waive the rights 
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granted to consumers (Article 7); this impedes downward adjustments of warranty-like 
duties. The limitation periods imposed by the Directive are two years for new products 
and one year for second-hand goods. The effect of these requirements is that sellers are 
no longer able to offer commercial guarantees for product defects covering shorter 
periods. Commercial warranties may extend the scope of the legal rights granted to the 
consumer, by not requiring proof that the product was defect at the time of delivery or 
offering a longer period of protection. Conversely, commercial warranties may not 
reduce the protection given to the consumer by reducing the limitation period within 
which the consumer may claim one of the remedies granted by the Directive. If lack of 
conformity becomes apparent within six months of delivery of the goods, it is presumed 
to have existed at the time of delivery (Article 5, 3) and the seller cannot exclude his 
liability by means of a contractual warranty (Article 7). 
 
Mandatory levels of warranties may be inefficient if consumers have heterogeneous 
preferences. A consumer who temporarily resides in an EC Member State may be 
interested to buy a second-hand car that (s)he will use during a six month stay (instead of 
renting a new car for the same period). This consumer will not be interested in a warranty 
for a one year period. The latter will be more attractive to a regular resident of that 
Member State, who would eventually even prefer a commercial warranty for a longer 
period. Mandatory rules do not allow satisfying these diverging preferences. Competitive 
markets may develop commercial warranties that are more in line with consumers‟ 
preferences. Uniform rules may decrease transaction costs if they reflect the preferences 
of the majority of contract parties. However, to avoid inefficiencies it is crucial that these 
uniform rules are not mandatory. In the opposite case, consumer choices may be reduced 
and consumer protection may become counterproductive. Schäfer and Ott report that the 
number of second-hand cars exported from Germany to non-EU countries has increased 
spectacularly from 10.00 per month in 1999 to 60.000 in 2002. In this way, less wealthy 
consumers are no longer able to buy a cheap used car from a professional seller.
26
 One 
does not escape from the question: Who protects consumers from consumer protection?
27
 
 
2. The duration of limitation periods  
 
The limitation periods imposed by the Directive are two years for new products and one 
year for second-hand goods. An economic evaluation of limitation periods entails a 
weighing of their costs and benefits. Ogus analyzes limitation periods which relate to the 
right of bringing a claim. This is a somewhat different topic from the limitation periods in 
the Directive, but the arguments provided by Ogus are instructive. On the cost side he 
distinguishes four elements.
28
 First, claimants who do not bring their claim within the 
limitation period lose the value of the remedy. Second, defendants do not get optimal 
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incentives for efficient behaviour because some of the possible claims will not be made 
within the limitation period. Third, the shorter the limitation period the more the claimant 
with a difficult claim will have to invest in obtaining the necessary evidence in time. 
Otherwise, (s)he will have to bring the claim without this investment and run the risk of 
failing the claim. This type of costs seems less relevant for the topic of non conformity 
discussed in this paper. Fourth, defendants may engage in opportunistic behavior thus 
trying to induce a delay on the side of claimants. Ogus also distinguishes four categories 
of benefits. First, litigation costs are reduced because some claims will not be made in 
time. Second, the costs caused by uncertainty whether or not a claim will be made 
decrease. Third, the costs of storing information that could be used in case a trial would 
follow decrease. Fourth, the error costs of wrong decisions caused by the deterioration of 
information over time are reduced. The latter two types of costs are less relevant for the 
topic of non conformity. 
 
The optimal limitation period is determined by a weighing of the costs and benefits they 
entail. In as far as the contract parties involved are best able to assess the costs and 
benefits that are relevant in their situation, they should be allowed to decide which 
limitation period suits their needs best. However, if such an agreed upon limitation period 
causes externalities, public intervention might be warranted. Parisi holds that, if sellers 
provide default warranties instead of negotiating them in every individual case, their 
duration will roughly correspond to the average time period that is likely requested by 
consumers. The optimal choice is the one that minimizes the sum of the transaction costs 
of renegotiation of separate warranty arrangements.
29
 Schäfer and Ott argue that short 
limitation periods on movables are problematic because often defects only emerge after a 
certain amount of time has elapsed. The shorter the limitation period, the larger the 
chance that the defect only emerges after the period has already expired. This would 
increase the costs as distinguished by Ogus. In determining the optimal limitation period, 
Schäfer and Ott spend attention to several factors.
30
 First, the more dynamic the 
development of a product the shorter the optimal limitation period will be. After all, 
consumers are not willing to pay for a long limitation period if they will replace the 
product within this period. Second, the longer the average lifespan of the product the 
longer the optimal limitation period will be. Third, the larger the scope for possible seller 
moral hazard the longer the optimal limitation period should be, in order to combat the 
incentive to produce goods that break down after the limitation period has expired. 
Fourth, the opposite holds for consumer moral hazard where buyer‟s behaviour is 
difficult to monitor. Fifth, the more valuable the product the longer the optimal limitation 
period will be. After all, the concept of decreasing marginal utility of wealth implies that 
with increasing losses the actor is willing to pay a higher insurance premium. 
 
In sum, the Law and Economics literature suggests that the optimal limitation period 
depends on many factors. The standard two year period for new products and one year 
period for second-hand goods does not allow this fine-tuning. Many cases are 
conceivable where rational, well-informed parties would like to agree on a shorter period, 
for example cell-phones. The technological developments succeed each other at a very 
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high pace, so that the „economic life cycle‟ of such a product is much shorter than two 
years. No rational consumer would be willing to buy a warranty of two years, given that 
he will have replaced his cell-phone with a newer type by then. Furthermore, the 
differences between cell-phones (with or without photo or video camera, mobile internet, 
Bluetooth, qwerty-keyboard, et cetera) and their respective prices, as well as the intensity 
of use are so great that the optimal warranty period will also differ. The fixed minimum 
limitation periods frustrate the possibility to meet the preferences of the different parties 
involved.
31
 Conversely, in cases where buyers underestimate the expected loss and on the 
basis of this incomplete information would buy an inefficiently short warranty, longer 
mandatory limitation periods could serve to correct this problem. 
 
3. Further comments 
 
In spite of the undesirable „mandatory warranty effects‟ of the conformity requirement 
and the inefficiencies caused by non-optimal limitation periods, some specific rules of the 
EC Directive show an implicit economic logic. Two examples may be given. First, 
consumer goods are presumed to be in conformity with the contract if they are fit for any 
particular purpose for which the consumer requires them and which (s)he made known to 
the seller (Article 2,2,b). This rule gives incentives to the seller to ask information from 
the buyer on the future use of the product (specific needs, in which environment, 
intensity) or to the buyer to convey this information. In section B.2 we already indicated 
that inefficient outcomes result if sellers cannot distinguish high loss buyers from low 
loss buyers. By receiving information about the purpose of the product use, this 
information asymmetry is overcome and the coverage of the „statutory warranty‟ may be 
set at an optimal level. The seller can decide not to deliver the good if it is not fit for the 
use envisaged by the consumer and may thus escape liability for non conformity. Second, 
there shall be deemed not to be a lack of conformity if the consumer was aware, or could 
not reasonably be unaware, of the lack of conformity (Article 2,3). This rule provides 
incentives to consumers to take efficient care when buying goods. If the consumer is the 
„cheapest risk avoider‟ warranty protection should be excluded (see section B.2). 
 
More problematic is the presumption holding that consumer goods are in conformity with 
the contract if they show the quality and performance which the consumer can reasonably 
expect “taking into account any public statements on the specific characteristics of the 
goods made about them by the seller, the producer or his representative, particularly in 
advertising or on labeling‟ (Article 2, 2,d). Prior to the Directive, seller‟s liability for 
producer‟s statements was not a common rule under national laws of the Member States. 
For example, in Germany courts did not hold sellers liable for producer‟s information if 
statements in advertising did not explicitly form part of the sales contract (with one 
notable, but heavily criticized exception).
32
 By contrast, in England recent case law 
suggests that the seller‟s reliance on the skill and judgment of the supplier in identifying 
goods suitable for a particular purpose, which may be deduced from promotional material 
for the retail trade, suffices to establish seller‟s liability.33 Under the harmonized rules, 
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sellers are liable for statements on the characteristics of the good made in advertising. 
From an economic perspective, it may be doubted whether sellers should be held liable 
for information provided to consumers the contents of which they cannot control. Of 
course, in as far as sellers are able to recoup their liability expenses from the producer, it 
is ultimately the latter who bears the negative consequences of public statements. 
However, recoupment is costly and it is not likely that in the end all relevant costs will be 
borne by the producer. Therefore, the producer may get incentives to issue public 
statements which increase his or her revenues, while the costs of these statements are 
borne by others. The seller may respond to this by increasing the price of the product, so 
that ultimately consumers bear the added costs. Targeting the producer in the first place 
makes more economic sense, because this provides incentives to the actor who actually 
controls the contents of the public statements.  
 
II. Remedies for the consumer 
 
EC Directive 1999/44 leaves consumers the choice between different remedies: i) repair 
or replacement, unless this is impossible or disproportionate, ii) price reduction, or iii) 
rescission of the contract, unless the lack of conformity is minor. There is an extensive 
economic literature dealing with remedies for breach of contract.
34
 We start this section 
with an analysis of this literature, since it provides relevant insights for the topic of this 
paper. Subsequently we analyze the remedies for non conformity, which are chosen by 
the Directive, from an economic viewpoint and we relate our findings to some of the 
country reports contained in this volume. 
 
1. General insights 
 
The literature on remedies for breach of contract focuses on the question under which 
conditions either damages or specific performance is the preferred remedy. The starting 
point of the economic analysis is that parties enter into a contract to benefit from it. The 
transaction produces a cooperative surplus, which increases the welfare of the parties 
involved. However, between the time the contract was closed and the time it must be 
executed, the circumstances might have changed in such a way that the fulfillment of the 
contractual obligations has become unprofitable. The question then arises if the creditor 
should be able to force the debtor to perform, or if (s)he should accept damages instead. 
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The economic answer to the above question is nuanced. In principle, if the cost of 
performance to the debtor exceeds the benefit to the creditor, damages are the preferred 
remedy. This is what parties would have agreed upon ex ante if they had covered this 
contingency in the contract. After all, agreeing that the debtor does not have to perform if 
his loss exceeds the benefit of the creditor increases the cooperative surplus. Parties can 
share this larger surplus and both benefit from this arrangement. Conversely, if a debtor is 
forced to perform under such conditions, (s)he will charge a premium for this obligation. 
Given that the cost of performing outweighs the benefit to the creditor, this premium will 
exceed the value that the latter attaches to performance ex ante. Hence, it is economically 
desirable that a debtor is allowed to breach the contract if the performance cost exceeds 
the benefit. If the debtor has to pay damages which bring the creditor in the same 
financial position as he would have reached if the debtor had performed, the debtor will 
make the correct decision on breaching the contract. „Expectation damages‟, which equal 
the value of performance to the creditor, lead to the ideal outcome of „efficient breach‟: 
the debtor only breaches if the cost of performing outweighs the benefit to the creditor, 
which maximizes the joint welfare of the contract parties involved. 
 
It must be added that the above line of reasoning holds only if the expectation damages 
fully compensate the creditor for the loss suffered. In practice, this ideal of full 
compensation is hardly ever reached. In many transactions, subjective values such as 
taste and emotions play an important role, so that it is (very) difficult to exactly determine 
the value of performance to the creditor. These uncertainties often lead to under- 
compensation.
35
 In addition, the advantages the creditor hopes to get out of the contract 
may be partly uncertain, for example the profit (s)he hopes to make with using a machine 
(s)he has bought. In as far as courts are reluctant to compensate an uncertain loss 
damages will again be under-compensatory. If damages are lower than perfect 
expectation damages, the debtor may also breach the contract in a situation where the loss 
of performance is actually lower than the loss of the creditor of non performance, so that 
social welfare decreases.  
 
The more difficult the correct assessment of damages, the more attractive specific 
performance becomes. The Law and Economics literature, therefore, agrees that specific 
performance is the preferred remedy if the contract concerns unique goods, such as 
objects of art and real estate, because subjective elements dominate when the size of the 
loss must be determined. In the case of replaceable goods, damages can be calculated by 
taking the price of a substitute good and are thus better feasible. However, there might 
still be some under-compensation because the creditor has to invest additional efforts in 
closing the second contract. The creditor loses time, may be annoyed by the non 
performance, and so on. These problems do not necessarily lead to a preference for 
specific performance, because in the latter scenario the unwilling debtor has to be 
monitored, which is also costly. Schwartz argues that damages should be the default 
remedy with replaceable goods, but that the creditor should be allowed to choose specific 
performance instead. This way, if the monitoring costs are high (for example, when the 
debtor has to perform a service) the creditor will prefer the default remedy. Only in cases 
where (s)he fears significant under-compensation (s)he will choose specific performance. 
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A last relevant element for determining the choice between remedies for breach of 
contract is the distinction between production contracts and other contracts. In the case 
new goods must still be produced, damages are the better remedy. As argued by Shavell, 
damages avoid inefficient performance in situations where production costs have risen. 
Conversely, if contracts concern the transfer of existing products specific performance is 
to be preferred in order to avoid the problems of under-compensation.
36
 
 
2. Economic analysis of the remedies provided by the Directive 
 
What can be learnt from the above analysis for the economic assessment of the remedies 
chosen by the Directive? In our view, the duty to repair resembles specific performance, 
because the debtor is forced to provide what (s)he should have delivered in the first place: 
a product which meets the conformity requirement.
37
 In many cases, repair will be a cost-
effective way to solve the problem of non conformity. However, the costs of repair might 
be higher than the value it adds or the value of the product in the first place. If the 
creditor could force the debtor to repair even in such circumstances, the latter would 
include a premium for this risk in the product price. This risk premium would be higher 
than the value of repair to the former. The provision that repair is no available remedy if 
it is disproportionate (or impossible, which economically speaking boils down to 
prohibitively high costs) therefore makes economic sense. In defining disproportionality, 
the Directive does not directly compare the seller‟s costs of repair with the value of repair 
to the buyer but with the costs of the other available remedies. In this respect, the 
Directive mentions as relevant factors: the value of the goods if there would have been no 
lack of conformity, as well as the significance of the lack of conformity. This opens the 
possibility for a correct weighing of the relevant costs and benefits. Whether an efficient 
outcome will be reached ultimately depends on the interpretation of the terms of the 
Directive. The German contribution in this Volume shows that disproportionality is 
sometimes interpreted as a situation where the costs of repair exceed 150% of the value 
of the goods.
38
 The correct economic weighing, however, requires a comparison of the 
costs of repair to the seller and the increase of value to the buyer. In the Spanish report it 
can be read that “the costs must be considerably more expensive”.39 Economically 
speaking, this is also a too strict criterion. According to Parisi, the Directive strikes a 
sensible balance between the need to protect buyers‟ legitimate expectations and the need 
to minimize the performance costs of the sale.
40
 In our view, whether or not the balance is 
sensible boils down to the interpretation of proportionality in practice. 
 
If repair is not possible or too costly, replacement is presented as an alternative remedy. 
At this point, we may recall the economic argument that in the case of replaceable goods 
the creditor can claim from the non performing debtor damages equaling the amount of 
the price of a substitute good. If the debtor provides the substitute by replacing the 
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defective product, the same result is reached. Obviously, the creditor should return the 
product, which did not meet the conformity requirement. Impossibility and 
disproportionality limit the availability of this remedy, which again makes economic 
sense. Another important consideration is that the buyer can use the remedy of 
replacement without first having to go to court, which would be necessary in case of 
damages (or if the proportionality of the repair costs must be assessed). This 
characteristic saves on adjudication costs.
41
 
 
In cases where repair or replacement is not available due to impossibility or 
disproportionality, a price reduction is possible. At this point, the Directive raises two 
issues. First, does the order (implying that a price reduction can be asked for only if 
repair or replacement is impossible) make economic sense? Second, how must the 
remedy of price reduction be assessed economically? Wehrt discusses the ex post effects 
that different remedies have on the interaction between buyer and seller after the non 
conformity has become apparent.
42
 His starting point is that subsequent delivery of a 
faultless product would normally provide the buyer with what (s)he contracted for. If a 
buyer prefers a price reduction over subsequent delivery, this indicates that (s)he prefers 
money compensation to getting a faultless product. Hence, the price reduction leads to 
over-compensation. Wehrt explains this outcome by arguing that the price reduction is 
based on the loss of an average buyer, so that consumers with lower losses prefer the 
price reduction. Next, if a buyer prefers rescission over subsequent delivery, this 
indicates that (s)he regrets the buy and that (s)he uses the non conformity claim as a way 
to get out of the contract. The rescission remedy should be restricted to situations where 
the non conformity provides new information about the product in its non-defective state, 
lowering the initial valuation of the buyer. The option of repair is important to avoid that 
the buyer can threaten to ask for replacement in situations where repair is much more 
cost-effective. Hence, the order of remedies, namely that the buyer at a first stage can ask 
only repair or replacement and that at a second stage price reduction or rescission become 
available as remedies, makes economic sense from the perspective of ex post incentives. 
This in its turn has an impact on the ex ante quality incentives. After all, if the buyer 
could systematically choose the remedy that suits him or her best (overcompensation 
through price reduction or rescission if he regrets the buy), the seller would get excessive 
incentives to avoid non conformity and over-deterrence would result. 
 
The second question relates to the (in)efficiency of a price reduction. It remains to be 
seen if this remedy is powerful enough to provide the producer with the correct incentives 
to deliver goods in conformity with the contractual obligations. Above, it already became 
clear that the correct magnitude of damages in case of breach of contract is determined by 
the value of performance to the creditor (expectation damages). Given that people only 
buy a product or service if they value it at least as high as its price, a mere price reduction 
might not be adequate to compensate the buyer for his or her loss. After all, (s)he did not 
want to buy a cheaper product of lower quality in the first place, but in essence that is 
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what (s)he gets after the price reduction. Torsello rightfully argues that price reduction is 
not a form of damages. In his view it is even more closely related to specific performance 
than to damages.
43
 What is relevant for the purpose of our paper, however, is the fact that 
price reduction is a remedy which consists of the payment of money, whereas repair and 
replacement require the debtor to live up to the original promises. The characteristic of a 
money payment makes sure that excessive performance can be avoided. Torsello states 
that price reduction is an efficient remedy in a situation where the buyer is not 
substantially deprived of his or her reasonable expectations. It is exactly this last 
prerequisite which in our view is troublesome. After all, a price reduction might not be 
able to compensate the buyer for the loss in value due to the non conformity. The 
Directive opens the possibility of a price reduction if the consumer is entitled to neither 
repair nor replacement, or if the seller has not offered the remedy within a reasonable 
time or without significant inconvenience to the consumer. These provisions might lead 
to inefficiency. If the buyer is not able to force the seller to repair the product within a 
reasonable time,
44
 the debtor does not get sufficient incentives to perform since (s)he is 
not confronted with the sanction of expectation damages.  
 
The last available remedy is rescission of the contract, except in cases where the lack of 
conformity is minor. In the legal literature, rescission is often regarded as a drastic 
remedy. This is understandable from the ex ante viewpoint. In that situation, both parties 
still wanted the contract to be executed. However, in the new situation that has arisen 
with the non conformity of the product, rescission is not necessarily the most drastic 
remedy. It might be much more problematic for the debtor to fulfill his original 
obligations than to reimburse the creditor the payments he already made. In essence, 
rescission boils down to the payment of restitution damages, which are lower than 
expectation damages. Therefore, the possibility of rescission might actually lead to 
under-performance because it is cheaper for the debtor to bring the creditor back in the 
position (s)he had before the contract was closed (restitution damages) than to restore 
him or her in the position which (s)he would have reached if the debtor had performed 
(expectation damages). Obviously, in as far as it is the creditor who is allowed to choose 
the remedy, this problem will not materialize because the creditor will not opt for 
rescission if this leads to problematic under-compensation. Since the remedy of rescission 
is available only if the other remedies are not effective, the possibilities of opportunistic 
behaviour (i.e. rescind when the needs or preferences of the contract partners have 
changed since the closing of the contract) are limited.
45
 Priest elaborates upon the costs 
that would be incurred if the court awarded damages to the buyer as compared to the 
costs of rescission.
46
 With damages, the court would have to calculate the buyer‟s loss 
                                                 
43
 M. Torsello, „Substantive and Jurisdictional Aspects of International Contract Remedies: A Comment on 
Avery Katz‟s “Remedies for Breach of Contract Under the CISG”‟, (25) International Review of Law and 
Economics 2005, p. 407. 
44
 For example, in the Netherlands the creditor has several legal options to force the debtor to perform. For 
the purpose of the current paper, the possibility to have the product repaired by someone else and to have 
the debtor pay for it is the most relevant. Furthermore, the debtor can be induced to perform by the use of 
civil judicial penalty payments. 
45
 Parisi 2004, p. 421. 
46
 G.L. Priest, „Breach and Remedy for the Tender of Nonconforming Goods Under the Uniform 
Commercial Code: An Economic Approach‟, (91) Harvard Law Review 1978, p. 963 ff. 
 18 
resulting from the defect, where the parties involved run the risk of over- or under-
compensation. Furthermore, the buyer (who keeps the defective product) has to adapt the 
product or dispose of it. Priest includes also the subjective costs of continued use of the 
non conform product (i.e. accepting that the product does not have all the characteristics 
the buyer expected). With rescission, the costs include the costs of returning the product 
to the seller, the costs of reselling the defective good and the buyer‟s costs of buying a 
substitute. Priest argues that the parties would agree to rescission if the sum of the costs 
of returning the goods is less than the amount of damages. It depends on many 
circumstances what the efficient remedy would be, especially if also the distribution of 
costs over the parties involved is incorporated. After all, this opens the possibility that a 
party would choose the non-efficient remedy because that is better for his or her private 
welfare. Rational parties would agree upon remedies that are more flexible than the mere 
choice between rescission and damages. This also includes possibilities of repair and 
price reduction. However, given the existence of uncertainties (e.g., price fluctuations) 
and the difficulties to estimate them, it is “difficult to determine the most efficient 
remedy”.47 
 
III. Allocation of liability within the contractual chain  
 
1. Direct claims 
 
The economic goal of liability rules is giving incentives to take efficient care to the 
parties who influence the size of the expected loss. In as far as the non conformity of the 
products sold is caused by the manufacturer, (s)he should ultimately be confronted with 
the negative consequences thereof. A direct action can help in this respect, because it 
enables the buyer to directly claim compensation from the manufacturer, so that (s)he is 
forced to internalize the negative externalities of selling defective products. A clear 
advantage of a direct action over the alternative of a multitude of individual proceedings, 
which obliges each party in the contractual chain to take recourse on its upstream 
contracting partner, is the savings on administrative costs.
48
 Besides this cost argument, a 
direct action may be needed to make sure that the producer is effectively confronted with 
the sanction of liability. As the English report in this volume illustrates, contractual 
exonerations as well as legal hurdles may seriously hinder the financial incentives of 
contract parties to travel through the contractual chain up to the producer. Admittedly, to 
solve such problems, it might make more sense to change the law with respect to the 
seller‟s right of redress. One should realize, however, that the EU has no power to 
harmonize rules not relating to consumer protection (see also section D). A third 
argument in favour of a direct action is that such arrangement protects the consumer 
against the bankruptcy of the retailer. This is primarily a justice argument focusing on 
compensation of the consumer, rather than an efficiency argument focusing on incentives 
for the producer. However, if the consumer can act only against the retailer, bankruptcy 
of the latter would effectively bar any claim reaching the producer. The possibility of a 
direct action avoids under-deterrence by ensuring that the manufacturer still retains 
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incentives to deliver goods in conformity with the contract in cases the retailers might go 
bankrupt. 
 
Besides these advantages, direct actions also suffer from shortcomings. First, it may be 
doubted whether consumers would actually initiate such a direct action. If the costs of 
starting such a claim outweigh the expected benefits, consumers may remain rationally 
apathetic. It is one thing to return the good to the seller and complain about the non 
conformity. It is quite another thing to directly contact the producer, who may be located 
in another country and not as close-by as the retailer, in order to get the problem solved.
49
 
This problem of rational apathy might be tackled by allowing collective actions or 
representative actions brought by consumer associations, but these enforcement schemes 
create problems of their own.
50
 Second, if a direct action is introduced by mandatory 
European rules, manufacturers lose the option to voluntarily offer the possibility of direct 
claims, which could serve as a signal of quality and improve market transparency.
51
 The 
gravity of this problem depends i.a. on the availability of other options to signal quality, 
such as the price of the warranty and the after sales services offered by the manufacturer 
(e.g. picking up and returning the product to the consumer‟s house in case of repair). 
Third, if the problem of non conformity was not caused by the manufacturer but by 
careless behaviour of a wholesaler or retailer, the direct action misaligns the incentives to 
take care. Finally, it may be more difficult for a manufacturer to control or detect the 
possible risk of consumer moral hazard than it is for the retailer. The latter party had 
personal contact with the consumer and had the opportunity to provide personalized 
information regarding the proper use of the product. 
 
2. Contractual liability of the entire distribution chain (network liability) 
 
If consumers could bring their claim against any of the parties in the contractual chain 
(manufacturer- importers/wholesalers- retailers) they would have more possibilities to 
effectuate their remedies. Network liability enables the consumer to choose the most 
convenient or most solvent party or the actor who enjoys the best reputation. How should 
we evaluate such a system from an economic point of view? If network liability increases 
the chances that the actor who is ultimately responsible for the non conformity is facing a 
larger probability of being confronted with the negative consequences thereof, the 
incentives to deliver goods of good quality will be positively influenced. This goal can be 
achieved in two different ways: i) recourse claims, and ii) a system of vicarious liability. 
Below, each of these scenarios is further elaborated upon.  
 
An example may illustrate how recourse claims may improve the incentives to deliver 
goods that are in conformity with the contract. If the retailer went bankrupt and the 
manufacturer is located in another country so that it is too costly for the consumer to 
effectuate a direct action, bringing a claim against the domestic wholesaler may be 
feasible for the consumer. If the wholesaler subsequently turns to the producer in a 
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recourse claim, the incentives to deliver goods that are in conformity with the contract of 
sale will ultimately reach the manufacturer. Given that in many instances non conformity 
is caused by the producer, this is a positive result. However, the costs of the recourse 
claims should not outweigh the benefits of the improved incentives. Besides the increase 
in administrative and litigation costs, it must be avoided that an actor in the distribution 
chain who was not responsible for the non conformity ultimately bears the liability 
because (s)he cannot take recourse on the responsible party. This may happen due to a 
contractual exoneration, which provides the liable actor with excessive incentives to take 
care if this lowers the probability of non conformity. This actor, in effect, could try to 
mitigate the insufficient care level of the responsible actor, who is not reached through 
the network liability. However, Parisi argues that the parties in the distribution chain are 
all repeat players, so that they may incorporate possible liability for non conformity into 
their contractual arrangements, which would lead to an optimal internal allocation of this 
risk. Furthermore, upstream suppliers will have incentives to select solvent retailers and 
to monitor them on their responsiveness towards the consumer, to avoid liability 
themselves.
52
  
 
Network liability can be understood also as a form of vicarious liability. This type of 
liability gives incentives to parties upward in the contractual chain to control the 
behaviour of parties active at lower levels of distribution. On the positive side, this may 
be economically desirable if the former have possibilities to reduce the risk of non 
conformity by controlling the behaviour of the latter. The economic optimality of 
vicarious liability depends on the characteristics of the case. First, the liable party must 
have possibilities to influence the behaviour of the party causing the loss that are different 
from the incentives provided by the buyer of the defective product. Hence, if the 
consumer may easily effectuate his or her remedies against the original seller, thereby 
providing adequate incentives, vicarious liability does not have an added value but causes 
only additional administrative costs. Second, vicarious liability is desirable in situations 
where the seller is not solvent and the producer has non-monetary incentives available to 
influence the behaviour of the seller. Third, if the producer has better information 
regarding the product characteristics, vicarious liability for non conformity can provide 
incentives to instruct the seller regarding the information (s)he should or should not 
convey to the consumer. Fourth, if retailers are more risk averse than producers, vicarious 
liability leads to a better risk distribution. This argument, however, is of limited value in a 
contractual setting, given the possibilities to distribute risks in the contractual chain. On 
the negative side, network liability creates monitoring costs that could outweigh the 
advantages in terms of deterrence.  
 
In the English report in this Volume, an interesting version of network liability is 
introduced. According to this proposal the consumer can not only sue his or her seller or 
the manufacturer, but any seller who distributes the product.
53
 Under the assumptions that 
the manufacturer is responsible for the non conformity and that the seller against whom 
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the consumer enforces his or her rights is subsequently indemnified by the producer,
54
 
this proposal makes economic sense. After all, the fact that the consumer can choose the 
most convenient authorized seller limits the problem of rational apathy (i.e. the negative 
individual benefit-cost ratio of bringing a claim). The assumption that this seller is 
indemnified by the producer ensures that the incentives ultimately reach the 
manufacturer. However, the proposal causes administrative costs which may outweigh 
the benefits. In addition, in cases where not the producer but the original seller caused the 
problem, the former has to pursue the latter, causing additional costs. This will for 
instance be the case if the non conformity is caused by the fact that statements of the 
original seller created expectations from the buyer which were not satisfied by the 
product. Network liability for such cases of non conformity may induce the manufacturer 
to better instruct and monitor his authorized sellers, possibly even eliminating them from 
his distribution channel if they fail to meet quality requirements.  
 
 
D. Must consumer sales law be harmonized?  
 
There is a vast body of Law and Economics literature on benefits and costs of 
harmonization of laws. On the one hand, divergent legal rules generate several benefits. 
Competition between legal rules allows satisfying a greater number of heterogeneous 
preferences and enables learning processes. On the other hand, competition between legal 
rules may cause inter-jurisdictional externalities or prisoners‟ dilemmas between states, 
which create a „race to the bottom‟. Also the existence of economies of scale and the 
reduction of information and transaction costs may plead in favour of harmonization. 
Besides the above arguments, which are based on the economic theories of federalism 
and regulatory competition, further arguments can be derived from Public Choice theory. 
This approach holds that a central regulator may be better placed to enact welfare 
enhancing regulation than decision-makers at lower levels who are exposed to lobbying 
by powerful interest groups. Below, we first provide a short summary of the main 
economic arguments
55
 and then apply these insights to EC Directive 1999/44. 
 
I. Regulatory competition or harmonization of consumer laws: benefits and costs  
 
1. Arguments favouring regulatory competition 
 
The starting point in the theory of regulatory competition is that twenty-seven competing 
national legislators are better than a single European legislator enjoying a monopoly in 
the market for consumer laws. Lack of competition in markets for legislation may cause 
inefficiencies similar to those in non-competitive ordinary goods markets. A 
monopolistic legislator may reduce output, so that fewer preferences concerning the 
contents of legal rules will be satisfied. If EC consumer law provided only default rules 
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(from which parties may deviate in their contracts) or was offered only as an additional 
(twenty-eighth) choice, the European legislator would facilitate the satisfaction of 
different consumer preferences across Member States, rather than impede a desirable 
degree of diversity. The main tasks of the European legislator would then consist of 
supplying information regarding the different legal systems and allowing parties to freely 
choose the applicable law. The Draft Common Frame of Reference
56
 contains provisions 
on conformity and warranties and can be regarded as such a source of information, which 
better enables parties to choose the legal rule that suits their interests best. However, the 
great bulk of EC consumer law consists of mandatory substantive rules.  
 
The „quiet life‟ of the ordinary monopolist finds its counterpart in the monopolistic 
legislator‟s reduced incentives to innovate. By contrast, experimentation and innovation 
are essential features of learning processes generated by regulatory competition. The 
theoretical background of this argument can be traced back to the reasoning of Nobel 
Prize laureate Friedrich von Hayek about the fundamental limitations of human 
knowledge.
57
 It cannot be assumed that law makers know the best legal rules in advance. 
The knowledge about the most appropriate remedies for solving new or even well-known 
problems of market failure (such as information asymmetries in consumer markets) is 
still limited. The quality of the performance of legal rules and systems of enforcement in 
a given jurisdiction is revealed by comparing it with the performance of different legal 
rules and systems of enforcement in other jurisdictions. The Hayekian concept is closely 
linked to the idea of „yardstick competition‟, implying that information about the quality 
of the performance of governments and enforcement agencies is revealed by comparing it 
with the performance of others. Politicians may thus be given incentives to copy superior 
solutions adopted in other jurisdictions. Regulatory competition will be strongest if there 
is free choice of law. Under the latter scheme, consumers may fully profit from trial-and-
error processes and will simply choose the laws that are best adapted to their 
preferences.
58
  
 
2. Arguments favouring harmonization 
 
Whereas there are strong reasons to support competition between rules of consumer 
protection (satisfying heterogeneous preferences, adaptability to national/regional 
circumstances and enabling learning effects), the arguments in favour of harmonizing 
consumer law are weak. A first argument relates to the need of internalizing negative 
externalities across jurisdictions. From an economic point of view, EC Member States 
should be able to choose the rules which best satisfy the preferences of their citizens as 
long as they also bear the full costs of their decisions. Where trans-boundary effects 
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occur, central rule making may be required to avoid that costs are thrown upon other 
jurisdictions. However, national consumer laws mostly do not create significant interstate 
externalities and, even if substantial cross-border effects occur, national consumer laws 
may cope with the externality problem. For example, a firm producing in a country with a 
low level of consumer protection which exports to a country with a higher level of 
consumer protection will be subjected to the stricter legal rules of the importing state.
59
 
Hence, national consumer law can deal with the issues of negative externalities, if any.  
 
A second argument favouring centralization of decision making and (minimum) 
harmonization is the risk of the „race to the bottom‟. Also this argument does not seem 
convincing. In the field of consumer law it seems highly doubtful that EC member states 
will strive for low levels of consumer protection to attract industry. Even in areas of law 
where one might expect a substantial impact of the desire to attract businesses on the 
choice of the regulatory burden for industry, theoretical and empirical research show that 
there is no convincing proof for a „race to the bottom‟ and that, by contrast, a „race to the 
top‟ may take place.60 It seems even more unlikely that firms will relocate plants to profit 
from lenient consumer laws. Member states cannot easily gain a competitive advantage 
by enacting lenient consumer laws, which in any case will not protect domestic firms 
from claims in export markets. More generally, it is doubtful whether states will engage 
in a race to the bottom if they cannot charge industry for using lenient rules of consumer 
law. At this point, a comparison with the alleged race to the bottom in American 
corporate law is illuminating; one must not forget that 16 percent of the total tax revenue 
of Delaware is derived from incorporation fees.
61
 Finally, the race to the bottom 
argument supposes that firms, which have to comply with stricter rules, suffer a 
competitive disadvantage. However, if rules of contract law are efficiency motivated 
(rather than based on distributional considerations) they will increase and not decrease 
the competitiveness of firms.
62
 In the latter case, the race will be for the „top‟ rather than 
for the „bottom‟.  
 
Third, scale economies in the production of legal rules and transaction costs savings 
could justify harmonization. Scale economies arise if it is cheaper to have legal rules 
produced by a single (international) legislator, because the information required is not 
only relevant at the national level, but also at the international level. Such scale 
economies are especially relevant in the domain of public law, e.g. safety regulation. 
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However, in the field of consumer law they seem negligible. Regarding the transaction 
costs savings, harmonization does not bring about the legal certainty so much desired by 
legal commentators. After all, harmonized law only yields legal certainty if the rules are 
interpreted and applied in a similar fashion throughout the European Union. This already 
causes problems at the stage where concepts in Directives have to be translated into the 
different legal systems. Furthermore, harmonization could even increase transaction 
costs, at least in the short run. New provisions have to be integrated into the national legal 
orders and this causes adaptation costs. These costs can be very high, especially if the 
harmonized law is also applicable to domestic transactions. Also, there is no empirical 
evidence that diverging laws impede cross-border trade. Consumers will not necessarily 
increase cross-border shopping if consumer laws are made uniform.  
 
Finally, one could argue in favour of EC intervention to cure potential deficiencies of 
national law. European law could accomplish a useful task if the rules of the import 
country do not allow a full internalization of externalities or do not correct market 
failures in an effective way. The task of the European legislator would then be to fill the 
gaps of national laws if, for some reason, national legislators cannot organize a water-
tight consumer protection. This line of reasoning points at inefficiencies in national laws 
and thus argues in favour of central rule making by stating that laws enacted by a central 
regulator are more efficient than laws enacted at lower levels of government. However, 
the view that EC consumer law is more efficient than national consumer laws is not 
generally supported by real-life harmonization.
63
  
 
II. EC Directive 1999/44 
 
The Consumer Sales Directive is one of many examples that confirm the general insight 
that economic arguments in favour of harmonizing consumer protection laws are weak. 
Member states may have different preferences regarding diverse policy options; they may 
either wish to improve information flows or prefer mandatory rules for protecting „weak‟ 
consumers. Also learning processes remain very important and should be kept intact, as 
the above discussion on optimal remedies (see C.II) illustrates. Generally, it would be 
wise for the European legislator to enact default rules that may be instrumental in looking 
for the economically optimal solution of complex problems. 
  
The most powerful economic argument in favour of harmonization is the need of coping 
with interstate externalities. From this perspective, the Consumer Sales Directive is both 
over-inclusive and under-inclusive. In this Directive the externalities problem is not a 
major concern of the European legislator. On the one hand, the Directive applies to 
purely domestic contracts, which do not generate any cross-border externalities. On the 
other hand, the important matter of upstream liability is curiously left out of the 
harmonization project.
64
 There is no rule to avoid that claims in cases of non conformity 
with the contract terms stop at the border. A consumer can sue a retailer, who could 
exercise his right of redress against a wholesaler or the importer, but the availability of a 
right of redress against the producer in an export country is left to the national law of that 
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country. Given the interstate externalities that an absence of upstream liability may cause, 
it is remarkable that the Directive does not regulate this issue. Other arguments that might 
support harmonization, such as the risk of a „race to the bottom‟ and transaction cost 
savings have been critically discussed above. These arguments also apply fully in the 
case of the Consumer Sales Directive.  
 
 
E. Conclusions 
 
Traders may sell goods that do not meet consumers‟ expectations. Economic analysis of 
law provides an explanation as to why goods of inferior quality may be sold and suggests 
legal remedies to overcome this deficiency. Warranties in this respect have several 
functions: they contribute to better risk spreading between sellers and buyers, they 
improve information flows in consumer markets and they provide incentives to perform 
the contract. Given these different economic functions, the optimal warranty varies 
according to the risk attitudes of sellers and buyers, the availability of information in 
markets and the possibility of either sellers and/or buyers to control the risk of non 
conformity. 
 
It seems clear that the drafters of EC Directive 1999/44 did not have the economic 
functions of warranties in mind when they laid down the requirement of conformity. 
Even though the Directive deals with commercial warranties separately, the duty to 
deliver goods that are in conformity with the contract and the two year limitation period 
for bringing claims for non conformity generate economic effects that are similar to those 
of a statutory warranty. This may generate inefficiencies. Due to the mandatory character 
of the Directive, sellers are no longer able to offer commercial warranties that exclude 
liability for non conformity within two years from the date of sale, even though buyers 
may wish to trade lower quality for a lower price. Besides the risk that fewer preferences 
may be satisfied, the Directive may be criticized also from the perspective of the 
signaling function of warranties. The European legislator missed the opportunity to 
improve market transparency by requiring a separate indication of the full price of the 
product (including costs of expected claims) and the price of the warranty (including its 
insurance function). In addition, fixed limitation periods generate inefficiencies since 
their optimal duration depends on a number of factors that vary across different consumer 
sales contracts.  
 
Economic analysis is also useful for assessing the efficiency of the remedies provided by 
the Directive. A general insight from Law and Economics is that performance of the 
contract is only desirable as long as the costs of performance do not outweigh its benefits. 
Expectation damages provide incentives for efficient breach. However, if damages are 
not assessed correctly (such as in the case of unique goods), specific performance may be 
the preferred remedy. The duty to repair resembles specific performance. By excluding 
this remedy when it is disproportionate, the Directive allows efficient outcomes provided 
the proportionality criterion is assessed by a comparison of the costs of repair to the seller 
and the value increase to the buyer. If replacement allows the debtor to offer a substitute 
good, the result comes close to the economic criterion that damages equaling the price of 
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a substitute good are an efficient remedy in the case of replaceable goods. The order of 
remedies, which obliges the creditor to first ask repair or replacement before a price 
reduction or rescission also makes economic sense. It avoids over-compensation and 
opportunistic rescission of the contract (because the buyer regrets the purchase). As a 
remedy, price reduction seems problematic since it may not compensate the buyer for the 
loss in value due to non conformity and cause under-deterrence. Rescission may equally 
lead to under-performance since restitution damages are lower than expectation damages. 
 
The conclusion of the section on allocation of liability within the contractual chain is that 
both a direct action and network liability have the potential to improve the incentives 
received by the manufacturer. If (s)he is indeed the party responsible for the non 
conformity, this is a positive achievement. However, these benefits should be weighed 
against the increase in administrative costs caused by recourse claims within the 
contractual chain. In cases where the incentive structure is not improved, e.g. because 
liability ultimately falls with a party who was not responsible for the non conformity, the 
evaluation turns out negative. After all, the increase in administrative costs is not made 
good by improved incentives. 
 
Finally, the paper has shown that economic arguments favouring harmonization of 
consumer sales law are weak. Preferences concerning levels of consumer protection vary 
across EU Member States and different rules remain necessary to enable learning 
processes. A risk to the bottom is unlikely and the suggested transaction cost savings are 
not substantiated by empirical evidence. Internalization of inter-jurisdictional 
externalities, which cannot be overcome by national laws, could potentially justify 
regulatory action at the European level but, remarkably, the Consumer Sales Directive 
does not deal with this issue.  
